Revisiting the greenbook's relative forecasting performance by Hubert, Paul
Revue de l’OFCE, 137 (VARIA, 2014)
REVISITING THE GREENBOOK’S RELATIVE 
FORECASTING PERFORMANCE
Paul Hubert1
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Since Romer and Romer (2000), a large literature has dealt with the relative 
forecasting performance of Greenbook macroeconomic forecasts of the Federal 
Reserve. This paper empirically reviews the existing results by comparing the 
different methods, data and samples used previously. The sample period is 
extended compared to previous studies and both real-time and final data are 
considered. We confirm that the Fed has a superior forecasting performance on 
inflation but not on output. In addition, we show that the longer the horizon, 
the more pronounced the advantage of Fed on inflation and that this superi-
ority seems to decrease but remains prominent in the more recent period. The 
second objective of this paper is to underline the potential sources of this supe-
riority. It appears that it may stem from better information rather than from a 
better model of the economy.
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Expectations are a crucial feature of most recent macroeco-
nomic models as they determine both current and future 
outcomes. Moreover, managing private expectations has taken 
more and more weight in monetary policymaking all the more so 
with forward guidance policies and this reinforces the importance 
of central bank macroeconomic forecasts as a tool for central 
banking. Their evolution should be consistent with the commit-
ment announced and the central bank targets (see Rosengren, 
2014, and Walsh, 2013).
1. I would like to thank Jean Boivin, Christophe Blot, Jérôme Creel, Bruno Ducoudré, 
Jean-Paul Fitoussi and Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau for helpful comments. Any remaining errors 
are mine. 
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Romer and Romer (2000) focused in their seminal paper on the 
relative forecast accuracy of Greenbook forecasts for inflation and 
output and showed that they were superior to private sector fore-
casts. This work has led many authors to assess the relative 
forecasting performance of the Federal Reserve and the US private 
sector among which Joutz and Stekler (2000), Atkeson and 
Ohanian (2001), Gavin and Mandal (2001), Sims (2002), Peek, 
Rosengren and Tootell (1998, 2003), Faust, Swanson and Wright 
(2004) and Amornthum (2006). 
The first objective of this paper is to survey this abundant litera-
ture and to realize an empirical review by gathering the different 
methods, data and samples used in the literature. The main issues 
are whether Greenbook forecasts2 are superior to private forecasts as 
measured by the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), whether 
this advantage holds for inflation and GDP, and whether this 
advantage has reduced in the recent period with the Fed greater 
transparency or the drop in the predictable component of inflation 
evidenced by Atkeson and Ohanian (2001), D’Agostino, Giannone 
and Surico (2006), Campbell (2007) and Stock and Watson (2007).
This paper uses a range of methods previously applied in the 
literature: unconditional comparisons, conditional comparisons 
through regressions in the spirit of Fair and Shiller (1989, 1990) 
and Romer and Romer (2000), a pooling method of forecasts, and a 
factor analysis. The sample period is extended compared to 
previous studies and both real-time and final data are considered. 
An alternative measure of inflation is also tested. This work is 
different from the most recent papers on this topic (Reifschneider 
and Tulip 2007, D’Agostino and Whelan 2008, and Gamber and 
Smith 2009) in the extent that their focus is on the most recent 
period, while the contribution of this paper is to survey the relative 
forecasting performance of the Greenbook over the full sample.
The results are the following: first, the Greenbook has a superior 
forecasting performance on inflation. There is no evidence of any 
2. It is worth noting that the Federal Reserve has greatly improved transparency about its 
decisions with the release of the statements, minutes and forecasts of Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) meetings since 1994, but still publishes its staff forecasts (so-called 
Greenbook forecasts) only after a 5-year lag. Because FOMC forecasts appear to be policy 
oriented (Romer and Romer, 2008, and Ellison and Sargent, 2012) or to act as a focal point for 
private forecasts (Hubert, 2014a), we focus on Greenbook forecasts.
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relative advantage for private forecasters or the Greenbook for real 
GNP/GDP. Second, it comes that the longer the horizon, the more 
pronounced the advantage of the Greenbook on inflation. This 
tends to confirm the advantage is sound and not due to access to 
information on the short run. This superiority is robust to timing 
disadvantage specification, introduction of lagged dependent vari-
able, multicollinearity, real-time or final data, and to CPI measure 
of inflation. Third, one more recent debate hypothesizes that this 
advantage is disappearing when considering new extended 
samples during which the US monetary policy regime was stable 
and inflation expectations became fairly well-anchored. This 
outcome seems challenged by unconditional comparisons and 
estimates on the stable subsample which exhibits significantly 
better inflation forecasting performance. This paper confirms that 
the gap between the Greenbook and private sector has narrowed 
but the former preserves a better forecasting performance. 
The second objective of this work is to underline some potential 
sources of the superior forecasting performance of the Greenbook. 
We use a factor model to disentangle the forecasting performance 
arising from the forecastable component of inflation (assumed to 
be based on a good model of the economy) and from the specific 
component (assumed to be based on better information about 
future shocks). Gamber and Smith (2009) attribute to the decline 
of the predictable component of inflation showed by Stock and 
Watson (2007) the narrowing of the Greenbook’s superior fore-
casting performance. A better model is assumed to improve 
relatively more the common forecastable component, the tech-
nical element, while better private information is assumed to 
improve relatively more the specific component, the judgmental 
one. Estimates suggest that the better forecasting performance of 
the Greenbook stems from better information about future shocks. 
This is consistent with the argument that the decline in the 
predictable component of inflation affects all forecasters and not 
only the Greenbook. Second, the stabilization of the Fed’s target 
and enhanced transparency may be much more responsible for the 
narrowing of the gap between the Fed and private agents. Third, 
this might be due to the amount of resources the Fed devotes to 
data collection.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 deals 
with the related literature. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
presents the different estimation methods. Section 4 estimates the 
Greenbook’s relative forecasting performance, while section 5 esti-
mates the potential sources. Section 6 concludes.
1. Related Literature
Many authors have already assessed the relative forecasting3
performance of the central bank and private agents and challenged 
the conclusions of Romer and Romer (2000). The following discus-
sion is organized on three main issues.
1.1. Are Greenbook’s forecasts superior to private forecasts? 
On the one hand, Romer and Romer (2000) find evidence of a 
superior forecasting performance of the Federal Reserve, by 
comparing the Greenbook forecasts to private ones on the 1969-
1991 sample. They show that the optimal linear combination of 
the private and Greenbook forecasts places a weight near to one on 
the Greenbook forecasts and essentially zero weight on private 
forecasts. Gavin and Mandal (2001) compare FOMC, Blue Chip 
and Greenbook forecasts. Based on the root mean squared errors, 
the Greenbook’s forecasts of inflation are more accurate than any 
other forecasts on the 1983-1994 period, while the results are more 
contrasted for output. Sims (2002) analyzes the performance of all 
Federal Reserve forecasts and finds that on the 1979-1995 period, 
Greenbook ones are the most accurate inflation forecasts, but that 
3. One question that arises from this literature is whether private forecasts do represent all 
private sector’s information. Private forecasts are considered through surveys of many 
institutions, banks or firms from various horizons. They gather information from diverse places 
and are too a source of information for some others agents. This point of view seems to be 
supported by the fact that surveys are good predictors (Ang, Bekaert and Wei, 2007). It is 
possible that forecasts of one individual institution are occasionally more accurate than the 
mean of all forecasters, but first, they do not represent information of all private agents and 
second, a forecaster that would succeed to consistently provide the best forecasts on the market 
would become a known reference. Evidence does not support this view. In addition, it is 
possible that surveys gather model-driven forecasters and “noisy” forecasters; using Sims’ (2002) 
procedure allows for dealing with this issue. Finally, it may be argued that these surveys tend to 
remove idiosyncratic differences. However, one might consider the opposite as these surveys are 
biased since respondents are generally the better informed agents through a selection bias. This 
reinforces the use of these surveys when assessing relative forecasting performance with the 
central bank.
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the difference does not seem large with the MPS model of the 
Federal Reserve (the ancestor of the FRB/US model). Using a factor 
analysis, he also shows that the superiority of the Greenbook over 
private forecasters is strong for inflation, and statistically negligible 
for output. D’Agostino and Whelan (2008) show the Fed maintains 
its superior forecasting performance only on inflation and at short 
horizons for the period 1974-1991. Gamber and Smith (2009) 
focus on inflation and find Fed’s forecast errors are significantly 
smaller than the private sector’s for the period 1968-2001. Amorn-
thum (2006) also claims that the Federal Reserve has a better 
forecast accuracy over the private sector by comparing inflation 
forecasts at the individual level in opposition to average consensus 
forecasts. Its results suggest that the Fed dominates SPF, but not all 
private forecasters and that this advantage decreases with longer 
horizon. Last, Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1998, 2003) confirm 
this superiority in a different framework with specific data.4
On the other hand, Joutz and Stekler (2000) examine the char-
acteristics of Fed’s forecasts and compare them to ARIMA models 
and ASA/NBER surveys on the period 1965-1989. They focus on 
usual errors measures, tests for rationality and features of accuracy 
of these forecasts and find that the Fed predictions overall tended 
to yield the same type of errors that private forecasters have 
displayed. Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) compare inflation fore-
casts from the Greenbook with a naïve model of forecast and find 
that the RMSE for both “are basically the same” and argue then 
that Greenbook forecasts have on average been no better than the 
naive model. Their study covers the years 1984-1996: a period of 
very stable evolution of inflation. Faust, Swanson and Wright 
(2004) are concerned with the Federal Reserve policy surprises and 
whether they convey some private information. They conduct two 
tests of hypothesis and find that the Federal Reserve policy 
surprises could not systematically be used to improve forecasts of 
4. They find that confidential supervisory information on bank ratings (CAMEL for “Capital, 
Assets, Management, Earnings and Liquidity”. This composite rating evaluates the health of 
banks on these five categories and delivers a score between 1 (sound in every respect) and 5 
(high probability of failure, severely deficient performance)) significantly improves private 
forecasts of inflation and unemployment rates, thus providing an informational advantage to 
the Federal Reserve. The contribution of this rating is independent too of publicly available 
leading indicators, adds significantly to private forecasts made even a full year after the 
information is gathered and released, and then provides a persistent informational advantage.
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statistical releases and that forecasts are not systematically revised 
in response to policy surprises. They conclude that there is little 
evidence that Fed’s surprises pass on superior information. Last, 
Baghestani (2008) finds unemployment forecasts are very similar 
between Fed and private forecasters for 1983-2000. 
1.2. Does this advantage hold for both inflation and GDP?
Romer and Romer (2000) and Peek, Rosengren and Tootell 
(1998, 2003) find that the better forecasting performance holds for 
both inflation and GDP while Gavin and Mandal (2001), 
Sims (2002), Joutz and Stekler (2000), Baghestani (2008) and 
D’Agostino and Whelan (2008) find either Fed has only a better 
inflation forecast accuracy or there is no relatively better fore-
casting performance for GDP or unemployment.
1.3. Has this advantage been reduced in the recent period? 
Reifschneider and Tulip (2007) find, with unconditional 
comparisons, that Greenbook forecasts perform identically to SPF 
since 1986. D’Agostino and Whelan (2008) and Gamber and Smith 
(2009) find that the Fed’s advantage has declined compared to 
private forecasters in the recent period. For the former, this advan-
tage holds only for very short horizons, and for the latter 
conditional advantage has disappeared, but unconditional 
comparisons still evidence Fed’s superiority. This issue is related to 
whether this advantage comes from the predictable component of 
inflation or not. Sims (2002) finds the superiority of the Fed on 
inflation is due to a better forecasting performance of the predict-
able component of inflation. At the opposite, based on Stock and 
Watson (2007), the drop in the overall volatility during the Great 
Moderation comes from the drop in the volatility of the predict-
able component of inflation, what may explain the narrowing of 
the Fed’s superiority according to Gamber and Smith (2009). 
Isolating the forecastable component may allow us for disentan-
gling the sources of superior forecasting performance. If the latter 
is based on a superior forecastable component, it may arise from a 
superior forecasting model, while if it is based on the specific part 
of the forecast, we may assume that the superior forecasting perfor-
mance arises from better information about future shocks.
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2. Data Description
2.1. Forecast Data
Forecasts considered are those of the Greenbook and the Survey 
of Professional Forecasters (SPF hereafter) and both are made avail-
able on the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. As 
a measure of inflation, the GDP price deflator is used since it has 
been consistently forecasted throughout the entire period by both 
forecasters, compared to the Consumer Price Index for which the 
definition has changed across time and has started to be forecasted 
later. We consider the mean of individual responses to each survey. 
Robustness tests with CPI are nevertheless performed. As 
commonly used in literature, the real GDP/GNP is the variable 
considered for the ‘growth’ forecasts. 
The Federal Reserve forecasts come from the Greenbook 
prepared by the staff of the Board of Governors before each 
meeting of the FOMC, and they are made available to the public 
after a five-year embargo. The sample goes from 1965:4 to 2001:4 
for both inflation and real GDP/GNP growth at different horizons. 
The sample stops at the beginning of the 2000’s when inflation 
became very stable and the predictable component of inflation 
dropped as evidenced by Atkeson and Ohanian (2001), D’Agos-
tino, Giannone and Surico (2006), Campbell (2007) and Stock and 
Watson (2007). Greenbook forecasts depend on the FOMC 
schedule and are not available at a quarterly frequency. For 
instance, there were almost a meeting every month between 1960 
and 1970 while eight forecasts per year in the 1980’s. We assume 
the relevant Greenbook forecast of a given quarter is the forecast 
made in the second month of the quarter, which date is the closest 
to the 15th day. The timing issue is crucial as Greenbook and SPF 
forecasts should correspond to the same information set. Inflation 
and output forecasts are the annualized quarterly growth rate.
The private forecasts are those of SPF and are now conducted by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia itself. It extends the 
American Statistical Association/NBER Economic Outlook Survey. 
It is based on several commercial forecasts made by financial firms, 
banks, university research centers and private firms and is made in 
the second month of each quarter. Data is available from 1974:4 
for inflation and from 1981:3 for real GDP without missing values 
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to 2001:4 (we refer to it as the ‘full sample’ afterwards). Here again 
forecasts are the annualized quarterly growth rates of the GNP/
GDP price deflator and the real GNP/GDP.
2.2. Real-Time versus Final Data
Actual data raise a particular issue. Final data are frequently 
revised between the different releases and the question is then to 
know whether comparisons have to be made with the preliminary 
estimate, second estimate or final estimate. Because some informa-
tion is not known directly or accounting standards change, the 
initial estimates are often revised. The advantage of real-time data is 
that it is close in definition to the variable being forecast. However, 
final data includes slightly more information. It is reasonable5 to 
consider that consistency of definitions is more important than the 
increase in information and hence prefer to use real-time data.
However, estimations will be performed with both types of 
actual data in order to check the robustness of the results and assess 
the importance of this issue for previous different results. The final 
data is the final-revised data (current vintage) provided by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Real-time data are those published in 
the next quarter, called second release data, and come from the 
Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists compiled at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.6 Both series, real-time and final, are 
computed identically as forecasts: they are annualized quarterly 
growth rates7 of real GDP and the implicit GDP price deflator.
3. Estimation Methods
3.1. Unconditional Comparisons
The simplest method to compare the forecast accuracy of both 
institutions is to measure their Mean Square Errors, which consti-
5. Forecasters attempt to forecast earlier announcements rather than later revisions (see Keane 
and Runkle, 1990).
6. For details on the Real-Time Data Set, see Croushore and Stark (2001).
7. The series which are already transformed into growth rates are stationary: the null 
hypothesis that each variable has a unit root is always rejected at the 10% level and most of the 
time at the 5% level. The investigation is carried out with the Phillips and Perron’s Test that 
proposes an alternative (nonparametric) method of controlling for serial correlation when 
testing for a unit root. These results are available upon request.
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tute unconditional forecast comparisons. In order to calculate the 
p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that Federal Reserve’s and 
SPF’s MSE are equal, the following equation is estimated according 
to Romer and Romer (2000):
 (1)
where πt+h is the actual inflation (or real GDP), either the real-time 
or the final data,  is the forecast made in date t for h    horizons 
later by the Federal Reserve,  by SPF in date t for h horizons 
later and α is the difference between the squared errors of forecasts 
of both institutions and then allows to calculate the standard 
errors of α corrected for serial correlation with the Newey-West 
HAC method.8 We can thus obtain a robust p-value for the test of 
the null hypothesis that α = 0, in order to determine whether the 
forecast errors are significantly different.
3.2. Conditional Comparisons: Regressions
In this section, the purpose is to compare the forecasts of the 
Federal Reserve with those of SPF with the regression methodology 
of Fair and Shiller (1989, 1990) and Romer and Romer (2000). The 
actual inflation is regressed on forecasts made by both institutions 
in order to know whether the Greenbook forecasts contain infor-
mation that could be useful to private agents to form their 
forecasts. The point as described by the authors is to see if “individ-
uals who know the commercial forecasts could make better 
forecasts if they also knew the Federal Reserve’s”. The standard 
regression then follows this form: 
               (2)
The main idea behind this regression is then to see if Federal 
Reserve forecast contains useful information to forecast inflation 
and more useful information than the one given by SPF forecasts 
by testing whether βGB is different from zero, whether βGB is 
different and higher than βSPF . Standard errors are here again 
8. When forecasts for four quarters ahead miss an unexpected change in the variable, this 
would cause forecasts errors all in the same direction. Forecasts are then declared serially 
correlated. In order to deal with this issue, standard errors are computed correcting for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation according to the Newey and West’s HAC Consistent 
Covariances method. The truncation lag is equal to the forecast horizon.
2 2
, ,( ) ( )+ +− − − = +
GB SPF
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computed using the Newey-West’s HAC methodology to correct 
serial correlation.
3.3. A Pooled Approach
Based on Davies and Lahiri (1995) and Clements, Joutz and 
Stekler (2007), this method consists of pooling forecasts across all 
horizons. The decomposition of forecast errors developed by these 
authors responds to whether it is adequate to pool the forecast 
obtained by different models, supposing that maybe forecasts at 
short and long horizons are not derived from the same models, 
and in the same manner to pool survey’s consensus that represents 
many individual forecasters.
Because of aggregating horizons, the method needs to deduct 
the correlation structure across errors of targets and lengths, which 
is consistent with rationality. The forecast error is:
(3)
where At+h is the effective value at t+h, Ft,h is the forecast made at 
the date t for a horizon of h periods, λt+h is the aggregate or 
common macroeconomic shocks which corresponds to the sum of 
all shocks ut that occurred between t and t+h, and εt,h is the idiosyn-
cratic shock. With the possibility for private information, the 
original formulation becomes:                  
 (4)
with . Without private information, the variance of 
the private component is constant for all h. If the Federal Reserve 
or SPF has private information, so the idiosyncratic component is 
absent (σ ²ε  = 0), what was the variance of macro shocks σ ²u
becomes the global variance of υth.
3.4. One Factor Model
Following Sims (2002), we apply factor analysis to decompose 
the high correlation between forecasts. It is used to explain the 
variance which is common to at least two variables and presume 
that each variable have also an own variance which represents its 
own contribution. The main assumption is that all forecasters have 
imperfect observations on a single ‘forecastable component’ (the 
, , ,t h t h t h t hA F α λ ε+ − = + +
, ,t h t h t hA F v+ − = +α
, , ,t h t h t hv = +λ ε
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common factor that gathers the strong covariance between fore-
casts), which they may or may not use optimally. If f * is the 
forecastable component of the realized value πth, or of the forecast, 
πFth we have the model:
      (5)
with Ω diagonal and f *th orthogonal to ε and ν. In this model, the 
quality of a forecast is related inversely to the variance of its εth and 
to the deviation of its θ coefficients from β. The coefficients are not 
proportional to the forecast error variances, because they may 
include a dominant contribution from the variance of ν ; the coef-
ficients are inversely proportional to the relative idiosyncratic 
variances, even if these are an unimportant component of overall 
forecast error. Sims proposes the possibility of a second component 
of common variation: a ‘common error’, but argues that analysis of 
forecast quality would then be limited and that despite its 
simplicity the model above provides “a good approximation to the 
actual properties of the forecasts”. This method could indeed allow 
discriminating between the part of forecast errors which arise from 
unforecastable macroeconomic shocks and the part which comes 
from idiosyncratic errors. Forecast quality is determined by the 
variance σ ² of εth, the specific variance proper to each forecast once 
the forecasts correlation has been gathered in a ‘forecastable 
component’. 
The interpretation of factor analysis estimates could be difficult 
in general, but even more in this fit because a simple model with 
only one factor is obviously not sufficient to explain the pattern in 
these data. An analysis with multiple factors would give better 
statistical results, but would be opposed to the main assumption of 
one forecastable component. Thereby, the likelihood ratio and the 
p-value of acceptable fit are likely to be low because of the delib-
erate choice and due to the fact that this method is sensitive to 
serial correlation and non-normality, two characteristics of 
forecasts.
*
*
F
th th th
th th th
th
th
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π λ θ ε
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3.5. Purpose and Relative Advantages of Methods
The most neutral and uncontroversial method to determine 
forecasting performance is the unconditional comparison of mean 
square errors. However, in order to assess the relative forecasting 
performance of the Greenbook and private agents, conditional 
regressions give more insight on the relation between both fore-
casts and more directly assess the information content of forecasts. 
This method is thus the most widespread in this specific literature. 
One shortcoming of this method is that estimates might be 
polluted by multicollinearity (Table 1 shows correlation among 
variables). A possible way, proposed by Sims (2002), is to gather the 
high correlation in a single factor: the forecastable component of a 
forecast. This method also allows for testing whether the fore-
casting performance arises from superior forecasts of the 
forecastable component (which may be related to the accuracy of a 
model of the economy) or of the specific component (which may 
be related to more information about future shocks). 
Tableau 1. Correlation
Inflation +1 - Final Data Inflation +1 - Real-Time Data
Actual GB SPF Actual GB SPF
Actual 1 Actual 1
GB 0.93 1 GB 0.91 1
SPF 0.91 0.96 1 SPF 0.87 0.96 1
Inflation +4 - Final Data Inflation +4 - Real-Time Data
Actual GB SPF Actual GB SPF
Actual 1 Actual 1
GB 0.88 1 GB 0.86 1
SPF 0.81 0.96 1 SPF 0.81 0.96 1
Real GNP/GDP +1 - Final Data Real GNP/GDP +1 - Real-Time Data
Actual GB SPF Actual GB SPF
Actual 1 Actual 1
GB 0.50 1 GB 0.47 1
SPF 0.49 0.80 1 SPF 0.47 0.80 1
Real GNP/GDP +4 - Final Data Real GNP/GDP +4 - Real-Time Data
Actual GB SPF Actual GB SPF
Actual 1 Actual 1
GB 0.17 1 GB 0.18 1
SPF 0.02 0.63 1 SPF 0.08 0.63 1
The full sample goes from 1974:4 for inflation and from 1981:3 for output to 2001:4. GB and SPF forecasts are 
annualized quaterly percentage changes.
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Last, the pooling approach is based on a decomposition of 
errors and also allows for disentangling aggregate from private 
forecast errors. The relative forecasting performance analysis 
focuses on the first two methods (section 4), while sources of supe-
rior Greenbook inflation forecasts (section 5) are investigated with 
the last two.
4. Relative Forecasting Performance
4.1. Are inflation or output Greenbook forecasts superior?
The baseline estimations have been realized on the full sample. 
Table 2 shows results of the MSE comparison. They are univocal 
concerning inflation forecasts: when both institutions are 
compared on the final data basis, Greenbook’s MSE are 0.93 and 
1.51 respectively at horizons h=1 and 4 while SPF’s MSE are 1.25 
and 2.46. The p-values show that these values are significantly 
different. The pattern is identical with real-time data. About real 
GNP/GDP, results are quite clear: the MSEs of Greenbook are 
comparable to those of SPF and the difference is not significant 
(with final or real-time data).
Table 2. Mean Squared Errors - Full Sample
Inflation - Final Inflation - Real Time
Horizon GB SPF p-value Horizon GB SPF p-value
1 0.930 1.251 0.02 1 1.196 1.716 0.00
4 1.517 2.467 0.00 4 1.737 2.576 0.00
Real GNP/GDP - Final Real GNP/GDP - Real Time
Horizon GB SPF p-value Horizon GB SPF p-value
1 6.097 6.234 0.74 1 4.612 4.619 0.99
4 6.248 6.519 0.54 4 4.727 4.851 0.74
The p-value is for the test of the null hypothesis that the central bank errors and private sector errors are equal.
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Table 3 summarizes the results of the benchmark regression. 
Regarding inflation, this first regression shows first that coeffi-
cients on the Greenbook forecasts are significant, while those of 
SPF are not at any time, and second that βGB is by and large near to 
one: 0.76 and 0.99 at horizon h=1 respectively for final and real-
time data and 1.38 and 1.21 at horizon h=4, while βSPF is next to 
zero. Concerning real GNP/GDP, the pattern is quite different: 
when analysing the baseline regression, at the short horizon h=1, 
both coefficients of Greenbook and SPF are very similar (around 
0.6) and significant at the 10% level, for both actual data. At the 
longer horizon h=4, coefficients of Greenbook and SPF are not 
significant. In comparison, the inflation results show strong 
evidence of a better accuracy of the Greenbook’s forecasts.
Table 3. Base Regression - Full Sample
Inflation - Final Data Inflation - Real-Time D
 Coef Std Error  Coef Std Error
Cst -0.5224** (0.2593) Cst -0.2827 (0.2781)
GB+1 0.7650*** (0.1211) GB+1 0.9931*** (0.1206)
SPF+1 0.2847* (0.1514) SPF+1 -0.0032 (0.1663)
Inflation - Final Data Inflation - Real-Time Data
 Coef Std Error  Coef Std Error
Cst -0.1855 (0.4520) Cst -0.3846 (0.4437)
GB+4 1.3851*** (0.2228) GB+4 1.2176*** (0.2360)
SPF+4 -0.3781 (0.2434) SPF+4 -0.1783 (0.2247)
Real GNP/GDP - Final Data Real GNP/GDP - Real-Time Data
 Coef Std Error  Coef Std Error
Cst -0.3840 (0.8778) Cst -0.2863 (0.8996)
GB+1 0.7277* (0.3701) GB+1 0.5313* (0.2976)
SPF+1 0.6422** (0.3017) SPF+1 0.6250* (0.3672)
Real GNP/GDP - Final Data Real GNP/GDP - Real-Time Data
 Coef Std Error  Coef Std Error
Cst 2.7710* (1.6030) Cst 1.8915 (1.4741)
GB+4 0.7407 (0.5537) GB+4 0.5483 (0.4455)
SPF+4 -0.5286 (0.5794) SPF+4 -0.1878 (0.4457)
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %.
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Estimates confirm that the Fed has a significantly better infla-
tion forecasting performance, while not for GDP.9 The range of 
possible reasons for the Greenbook’s advantage on inflation and 
not output is large. The weight put on inflation in the central bank 
loss function might matter: if the Fed greatly balances inflation, it 
will make everything possible to reach its inflation goal and then 
endogenises inflation by dint of focusing on it. Thus the second vari-
able, the output growth, becomes an adjustment variable, all the 
more so the Fed attempt to reach its ‘implicit’ inflation target. It 
might also be assumed that inflation is easier to measure than 
output. GDP may be more difficult to forecast because of the uncer-
tainty of future data revisions. Blix, Wadefjord, Wienecke and 
Adahl (2001) analyze the forecasting performance of 250 major 
institutions and highlight that growth is much more difficult to 
forecast than inflation.
Robustness Test: Timing
The timing of the baseline equation is assessed by putting the 
Greenbook in a deliberate situation of a timing disadvantage. In 
the benchmark case, forecasts come from the same quarter. 
Because the date when the forecasts are made in the quarter varies, 
the Greenbook may sometimes benefit of a possible timing advan-
tage. The equation estimated, in which  is the Greenbook 
forecast made one quarter before SPF and for one quarter later, is:
 (6)
Table 4 exhibits the regression results. Except for final data at 
short horizon (h=1), coefficients of Greenbook inflation forecasts 
are significant while those of SPF are not, are always largely supe-
rior to those of the SPF, and are included between 0.71 and 0.97, so 
significantly near to one. The superior forecasting performance 
seems to be higher when the horizons are longer, whatever the 
type of actual data.
9. The similar GDP forecasts accuracy between the Fed and private agents could bridge with 
Tulip (2009) which finds uncertainty is still as high as in 1970s and has been less reduced than 
volatility.
1, 1
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t hπ − +
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Robustness Test: Multicollinearity
Univariate regressions of the realized inflation on one forecast 
at a time are estimated to check that the benchmark regression is 
not distorted by multicollinearity as discussed by Granger and 
Newbold (1977):
  (7)
The statistical indicator of the explanatory power of the model 
(the R²) with Greenbook forecasts is compared to the one of private 
forecasts, so as to ensure that estimates of the main regression are 
confirmed when forecasts are compared one by one and not 
together. It may also be informative to have a look at the coeffi-
cient βGB or SPF. On table 5, one can observe that the R² is 
consistently higher for the Greenbook inflation forecasts 
compared to the SPF ones, the gap rising when the horizon is 
longer, whatever actual data are.
Table 4. Timing Disadvantage - Full Sample
Inflation - Final Data Inflation - Real-Time Data
 Coef Std Error  Coef Std Error
Cst -0.6614** (0.2651) Cst -0.4570 (0.2956)
GB+2 0.4805*** (0.1714) GB+2 0.7161*** (0.2072)
SPF+1 0.5975*** (0.1969) SPF+1 0.3121 (0.2323)
Inflation - Final Data* Inflation - Real-Time Data*
 Coef Std Error  Coef Std Error
Cst -0.5284 (0.4824) Cst -0.7914 (0.5117)
GB+5 0.9727*** (0.2859) GB+5 0.9247*** (0.2417)
SPF+4 0.0655 (0.2833) SPF+4 0.1802 (0.2876)
Real GNP/GDP - Final Data Real GNP/GDP - Real-Time Data
 Coef Std Error  Coef Std Error
Cst -0.4633 (1.1861) Cst -0.0887 (1.0243)
GB+2 0.0719 (0.3882) GB+2 -0.1880 (0.3083)
SPF+1 1.3057*** (0.3414) SPF+1 1.2545*** (0.3773)
Real GNP/GDP - Final Data* Real GNP/GDP - Real-Time Data*
 Coef Std Error  Coef Std Error
Cst 3.2392* (1.7349) Cst 2.2244 (1.5707)
GB+5 0.8660 (0.6184) GB+5 0.2689 (0.4746)
SPF+4 -0.8467 (0.7725) SPF+4 -0.0685 (0.6585)
*only 90 obs, because GB don't always publish forecasts at horizon h=5
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %.
,
GB or SPF
t h GB or SPF tt hπ α β π ε+ = + ⋅ +
Revisiting the Greenbook’s relative forecasting performance 167
Robustness Test: Additional information beyond a lagged dependent 
variable
The purpose of this test is to assess whether the coefficient asso-
ciated to Greenbook or private forecasts are significant because 
they are highly correlated to realizations or because they provide 
additional information besides the information set known at the 
date when the forecast is made. Assuming that a lagged dependent 
variable – the actual data – comprises all the information available 
when the forecast is made, the following equation enables to assess 
whether the forecast really contains superior forward looking 
information: 
(8)
Table 6 presents the estimates of the regression with the lagged 
dependent variable. They strongly confirm the previous results: 
the coefficient associated to Greenbook’s inflation forecasts is 
Table 5. Multicollinearity - Full Sample
Inflation - Final Data - 1974:4-2001:4 Inflation - Real Time Data - 1974:4-2001:4
 Coef Adj. R²  Coef Adj. R²
GB+1
1.019***
0.87 GB+1
0.990***
0.83
(0.05) (0.06)
SPF+1
1.071***
0.83 SPF+1
1.018***
0.76
(0.06) (0.08)
GB+4
1.061***
0.77 GB+4
1.065***
0.74
(0.12) (0.12)
SPF+4
1.095***
0.66 SPF+4
1.117***
0.66
(0.17) (0.16)
Real GNP/GDP - Final Data - 1981:3-2001:4 Real GNP/GDP - Real Time - 1981:3-2001:4
 Coef Adj. R²  Coef Adj. R²
GB+1
1.147***
0.25 GB+1
0.939***
0.21
(0.31) (0.26)
SPF+1
1.349***
0.23 SPF+1
1.141***
0.21
(0.34) (0.32)
GB+4
0.489
0.02 GB+4
0.459
0.02
(0.51) (0.45)
SPF+4
0.080
-0.01 SPF+4
0.262
-0.01
(0.65) (0.57)
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
The dependant variable is noted above each subtable. The constant has been removed from the table.
1 , ,
GB SPF
t h t GB t h SPF t h tππ α β π β π β π ε+ −= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
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significant for either final or real time data, at both one and four 
quarter horizons.
Robustness to an Alternative Inflation Variable
An argument may be that private agents are more prone to fore-
cast the Consumer Price Index (CPI) than the GDP price deflator, 
and this might be a reason for their less accurate performance in 
forecasting inflation. In order to check the robustness of the 
previous results for inflation, additional tests with CPI are then 
provided. Data are available from the same sources from 1982Q1 to 
2001Q4. Table 7 displays evidence that confirms the previous 
results and show that the variable chosen for inflation, GDP 
deflator or consumer inflation, does not lead to reconsider the rela-
tively better accuracy of Greenbook forecasts.
Table 6. Regressions with lagged dependent variable - Full Sample
Inflation
Final Data Real-Time Data
 Coef Std Error  Coef Std Error
Cst -0.495* (0.274) Cst -0.352 (0.299)
AR(1) 0.031 (0.101) AR(1) -0.031 (0.129)
GB+1 0.736*** (0.147) GB+1 0.950*** (0.134)
SPF+1 0.277 (0.167) SPF+1 0.087 (0.211)
Cst -0.109 (0.417) Cst -0.343 (0.419)
AR(1) -0.006 (0.146) AR(1) -0.001 (0.142)
GB+4 1.478*** (0.248) GB+4 1.312*** (0.210)
SPF+4 -0.480 (0.241) SPF+4 -0.269 (0.249)
Real GDP
Final Data Real-Time Data
 Coef Std Error  Coef Std Error
Cst 0.357 (0.724) Cst 0.264 (0.942)
AR(1) 0.303*** (0.078) AR(1) 0.086 (0.099)
GB+1 0.327 (0.306) GB+1 0.236 (0.177)
SPF+1 0.449 (0.319) SPF+1 0.664* (0.362)
Cst 2.792* (1.565) Cst 1.597 (1.309)
AR(1) 0.002 (0.106) AR(1) -0.004 (0.122)
GB+4 0.746 (0.626) GB+4 0.368 (0.516)
SPF+4 -0.580 (0.646) SPF+4 0.086 (0.487)
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %.
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Robustness to the Actual Data Issue
The superiority of the Greenbook forecasts is more pronounced 
with real-time data. However, in the end, whatever inflation data 
considered are real-time or final, the results give similar indica-
tions on the Greenbook’s superior forecasting performance, and 
tend to support that relative forecast accuracy here is not subject 
to variation in data definitions. Furthermore, an identical scheme 
emerges from all methodologies: Fed and SPF better forecast real-
Table 7. Robustness: CPI - 1982:1 - 2001:4
Mean Square Errors
Horizon GB SPF p-value
1 4.510 4.770 0.443
4 4.137 4.498 0.018
Regressions
Base
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 0.855 (0.819) Cst 1.271 (0.819)
GB+1 1.066* (0.644) GB+4 1.109** (0.469)
SPF+1 -0.391 (0.775) SPF+4 -0.553 (0.533)
Timing Disadvantage
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 1.489 (1.033) Cst 1.226 (0.991)
GB+2 1.131*** (0.261) GB+5 1.275* (0.747)
SPF+1 -0.672 (0.522) SPF+4 -0.710 (0.827)
Multicollinearity
Coef Adj. R² Coef Adj. R²
GB+1
0.775***
0.140 SPF+1
0.739***
0.085
(0.193) (0.261)
Coef Adj. R² Coef Adj. R²
GB+4
0.643***
0.102 SPF+4
0.596***
0.068
(0.191) (0.224)
with Lagged Dependent Variable
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 0.744 (0.840) Cst 1.444 (1.001)
AR(1) -0.118 (0.158) AR(1) -0.181* (0.104)
GB+1 0.878 (0.571) GB+4 1.397*** (0.497)
SPF+1 -0.058 (0.716) SPF+4 -0.722 (0.672)
*,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
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time value of real GDP while they both have more accurate predic-
tions of final data of inflation. One possible explanation may 
come from the method of constructing the GDP aggregate and the 
assumption about the growth trend which are often revised. The 
advantage of real-time data is that it is close in definition to the 
variable being forecast.
Finally, it consistently appears from the benchmark estimation 
and the robustness tests that the longer the horizon, the more 
pronounced the advantage of the Greenbook on inflation. With 
longer horizons, the uncertainty is greater and the fact that the 
superiority of Greenbook forecasts increase tends to confirm that 
the advantage is robust and not due to timing advantage and/or 
access to information on the short run. 
4.2. Has this advantage on inflation reduced in the recent period? 
We focus in this section on inflation forecasts for which there is 
evidence of superior forecasting of the Greenbook over the full 
sample. Unconditional comparisons and the benchmark condi-
tional regression are estimated on a reduced sample to take into 
account the choice of Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) to rule out the 
period of strong disinflation of the beginning of the eighties. Due 
to the private agents’ idea that the Federal Reserve will not succeed 
to reduce inflation, Greenbook forecasts could have been better 
than private forecasts. The first sub-sample starts in 1987Q3 when 
Greenspan took his function. The end of the sample is still 
2001Q4. In the same manner, D’Agostino and Whelan (2008) and 
Gamber and Smith (2009) show that with the drop in volatility in 
predictable component of inflation and greater transparency of the 
Fed since 1992 and 1994, the superior forecasting performance of 
the Fed has been reduced. We therefore estimate the regression on 
two other sub-samples starting in 1992Q1 and 1994Q1 in order to 
assess the Greenbook’s forecasting superiority on samples during 
which the US monetary policy regime was stable and inflation 
expectations became fairly well anchored.
Table 8 reveals the coefficients of the regression made on 
smaller samples. Estimates show a different picture: if we consider 
the largest subsample, from 1987 to 2001, it appears that outcomes 
are in line with the previous ones: Greenbook inflation coefficients 
are significant and close to one at both horizons (while not for the 
Revisiting the Greenbook’s relative forecasting performance 171
SPF). However, when considering the two other subsamples 
starting in 1992 or 1994 as D’Agostino and Whelan (2008) and 
Gamber and Smith (2009) respectively do, it appears that the coef-
ficient of Greenbook forecasts is not significant anymore. These 
two estimations are nevertheless based on smaller samples and so 
fewer observations as emphasized by Gamber and Smith (2009). In 
addition, these subsamples comprise a very stable period for which 
conditional comparisons lack variability. This calls for assessing 
forecast accuracy with unconditional comparisons.
Table 8. Inflation Forecasts - Smaller Sample Periods
 Final Data Real-Time Data
                1987Q3-2001Q4
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst -0.049 (0.378) -0.534 (0.433)
GB+1 0.533*** (0.198) 0.831*** (0.206)
SPF+1 0.346 (0.208) 0.215 (0.193)
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 0.229 (0.554) -0.484 (0.653)
GB+4 0.804** (0.395) 0.945*** (0.346)
SPF+4 -0.015 (0.450) 0.086 (0.431)
                1992Q1-2001Q4
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 0.916* (0.479) 0.623 (0.682)
GB+1 0.158 (0.317) 0.268 (0.243)
SPF+1 0.271 (0.385) 0.243 (0.401)
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 1.772** (0.700) 0.788 (0.969)
GB+4 0.132 (0.603) 0.389 (0.484)
SPF+4 -0.065 (0.447) 0.054 (0.457)
                1994Q1-2001Q4
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 1.149** (0.491) 0.817 (0.736)
GB+1 0.202 (0.358) 0.395 (0.301)
SPF+1 0.113 (0.431) 0.024 (0.496)
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 2.547*** (0.804) 1.747 (1.066)
GB+4 0.254 (0.595) 0.425 (0.407)
SPF+4 -0.533 (0.520) -0.411 (0.500)
*,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
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Tables 9 and 10 present the Mean Square Errors for respectively 
GDP deflator and CPI on the three shorter subsamples and shows 
that Greenbook inflation forecasts errors remains smaller than SPF 
ones and this result is still more pronounced at the longer horizon 
(4 quarters ahead). Greenbook‘s four quarter ahead forecasts outper-
form SPF ones more for GDP deflator than for CPI. One potential 
explanation may be that the private forecasters pay closest atten-
tion in the recent period to consumer inflation, while the 
Greenbook provides more accurate forecasts for the other compo-
nents of GDP. This paper confirms that the gap between the 
Greenbook and private forecasters has narrowed in the recent 
period but the Fed still preserves a superior forecasting performance.
Table 9. Mean Squared Errors - Smaller Sample Periods
Inflation - Final Inflation - Real Time
1987Q3-2001Q4
Horizon GB SPF p-value Horizon GB SPF p-value
1 0.641 0.761 0.247 1 0.790 1.013 0.059
4 0.670 1.121 0.000 4 0.796 1.298 0.0002
1992Q1-2001Q4
Horizon GB SPF p-value Horizon GB SPF p-value
1 0.626 0.672 0.648 1 0.798 0.891 0.343
4 0.639 1.094 0.001 4 0.745 1.297 0.002
1994Q1-2001Q4
Horizon GB SPF p-value Horizon GB SPF p-value
1 0.678 0.696 0.892 1 0.817 0.893 0.527
4 0.759 1.146 0.017 4 0.872 1.352 0.018
The p-value is for the test of the null hypothesis that the central bank errors and private sector errors are equal.
Table 10. Mean Square Errors: CPI - Smaller Sample Periods
1987:3 - 2001:4 1992:1 - 2001:4 1994:1 - 2001:4
GB SPF p-val GB SPF p-val GB SPF p-val
h=1 3.867 3.798 0.706 3.493 3.521 0.898 3.956 4.074 0.650
h=4 3.555 3.788 0.071 3.585 3.820 0.098 4.082 4.253 0.274
The p-value is for the test of the null hypothesis that GB’s errors and SPF’s errors are equal.
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5. Sources of Superior Inflation Forecasts
Many arguments have been put forward in the literature to 
explain the superior forecasting performance of the Greenbook: (i)
the institutional and inherent advantage possessed by the central 
bank about its own future policy path, (ii) secrecy provides to the 
Fed a relative enhanced information set compared to private fore-
casters, (iii) the knowledge derived from the role of supervisor and 
regulator of banks (Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1998) and 
(2003)), (iv) an expertise advantage leading Sims (2002) to argue 
that “the Fed is simply making better use than other forecasters of 
the same collection of aggregate time series available to all”, (v) the 
fact that as reported by Romer and Romer (2000) the Fed succeeds 
in collecting better and larger detailed information about determi-
nants of future inflation, thanks to the amount of resources the 
Fed devotes to it relative to firms or banks. 
Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) and Swanson (2006) show 
based on market expectations of the fed funds rate that US markets 
are rarely surprised by the Fed at very short horizons as a few 
weeks. For longer horizon, the performance of market expectations 
is poorest, which may support the argument (i). However, Hubert 
(2014b) shows that prior knowledge of the future policy path is not 
a sufficient condition to benefit from a superior forecasting perfor-
mance. In addition, interest rate paths result from macroeconomic 
forecasts and are in fact endogenous to the specific expertise of the 
central bank. 
Concerning the argument (iii), Peek, Rosengren and Tootell 
(1998, 2003) suggest the Fed obtains an exploitable informational 
advantage from its supervisory role and more specifically from non 
market traded banks, for which the data are confidential and 
remain so for a significant period of time. These works could be put 
together with the ones of Kashyap and Stein (1994a, 1994b, 2000) 
finding small banks may be particularly important for the level of 
economic activity because they disproportionately lend to finance 
inventories and small business. Thus, all information that could be 
gathered from this side is ‘unavailable’ to private sector and seems 
useful and used by the Fed via its supervisory role. 
Although networks allow information to circulate very quickly 
and the hypothesis that the financial markets properly aggregate 
Paul Hubert174
information, the argument of a specific expertise either on the right 
model of the economy (iv) or in a better gathering and processing of 
information (v) seems relevant for several reasons. First, despite 
recent huge progresses in the information process, coordination, 
uncertainty, heterogeneity of information processing capacities 
and noisy signals are still rendering information imperfect as the 
thriving literature on those subjects attests; second, Bernanke and 
Boivin (2003)10 develop a data-rich environment model that 
confirms aggregation and exploitation of a very large amount of 
data has an added-value for monetary policy analysis. Third, Faust 
and Wright (2009) show that Greenbook inflation forecasts domi-
nate large dataset methods. The main issue is therefore to assess 
whether the Fed has a better model of the economy (and makes a 
better use of public data) or has superior (private) information.
Predictable component or specific errors?
A factor model and a pooling approach are used to test whether 
the forecasting performance arises from superior forecasts of the 
forecastable component (which may be related to the accuracy of 
the model of the economy) or of the specific component (which 
may be related to more information about future shocks). It might 
be argued that a better model of the economy produces low idio-
syncratic errors or that private information enhances the 
forecastable component. The main assumption is that generally a 
better model improves relatively more the common forecastable 
component, the technical element, while better private informa-
tion improves relatively more the specific component, the 
judgmental one.
Table 11 presents the estimates of the factor analysis11 on the 
full sample. The model based on the hypothesis of a common and 
unique forecastable component ascribes a high coefficient θ to the 
forecastable component to both Greenbook and private forecasts, 
10. Their analysis besides compare the forecasting performance of the Greenbook to their data-
rich model: FM-VAR and to combination of the Greenbook and their model. They find 
Greenbook does marginally worse than FM-VAR for next quarter’s inflation (CPI here) forecast 
and better for longer horizons, while unemployment forecasts are comparable. These outcomes 
appear to be in line with those found here. The combination forecasts have broadly similar 
(verily better) forecasting performance than Greenbook forecasts.
11. The naive forecast series is added in order to get a benchmark in the one factor model. This 
series corresponds to static forecasts, i.e. the value at the date t is the forecast at the date t+1. 
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and a low idiosyncratic error σ ² to Greenbook forecasts compared 
to naïve and SPF forecasts. While at a short horizon h=1, the differ-
ence is weak (as in the Sims’ paper), the difference at horizon h=4 is 
clear for inflation with both actual data. These results suggest that 
the forecast accuracy of Greenbook inflation forecasts arises from 
their low idiosyncratic error. 
This result is confirmed by pooling approach estimates in 
table 12, which show that Greenbook global errors are smaller 
than SPF ones, under the assumption that either the Greenbook or 
the SPF has private information. In addition, pooling approach 
estimates also confirm that both the bias and the absolute error of 
Greenbook forecasts are smaller.
Under the assumption that the forecastable component is 
related to the accuracy of a model of the economy) and that the 
specific component is related to information about future shocks, 
then the preceding estimates suggest the source of superior Green-
book forecasts stems from better information about future shocks. 
The result of Stock and Watson (2007) that inflation has become 
harder to forecast and that the predictable component of inflation 
has dropped is consistent with the decrease of the Greenbook’s 
superiority in the recent period but should have a negligible effect 
on the relatively better forecasting performance of the Fed, as its 
main source of superior forecasts seems to be its information set 
about future shocks. This is consistent with the intuition that the 
Table 11. One Factor Model
Inflation - Final Data Inflation - Real-Time Data
Horizon h=1 Horizon h=4 Horizon h=1 Horizon h=4
θ σ² θ σ² θ σ² θ σ² 
Actual 0.94 0.11 0.88 0.22 0.92 0.16 0.87 0.25
GB 0.98 0.04 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.03 0.99 0.01
SPF 0.98 0.05 0.96 0.08 0.97 0.06 0.96 0.08
Naïve 0.93 0.13 0.89 0.20 0.90 0.18 0.88 0.22
N_obs 109 N_obs 109 N_obs 109 N_obs 109
log LH -0.048 log LH -0.291 log LH -0.116 log LH -0.179
 p-value 0.079 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.002 p-value 0.000
θ is the coefficient associated to the forecastable component and σ² is the variance of the forecast error.
Results are from the estimation of the model described in equations 5 in the text.
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decline in the predictable component of inflation affects all fore-
casters and not only the Fed. 
Two explanations for the decrease of the Fed superiority may be 
that the inflation rate has flattened out with the Great Moderation 
and lagged inflation now evolves around the Fed’s target, 
compared to the previous period when inflation was on a down-
ward trajectory and private sector were learning slowly the Fed’s 
target; or that enhanced transparency of the Fed may disclose a 
part of its private information about future shocks.
6. Conclusion
This paper assesses the relative forecasting performance of the 
Greenbook and the private sector in the US. The results are four-
fold: first, on the full sample, the Greenbook possesses a superior 
forecasting performance on inflation, but not on output. Second, it 
appears that the longer the horizon, the more pronounced the 
advantage on inflation. This tends to confirm the advantage is 
sound. Third, estimates show that this advantage is decreasing but 
remains prominent when considering very short and recent subsa-
mples. Fourth, the Greenbook’s better forecasting performance 
seems to stem from superior information.
Table 12. Forecasts Pooled over Horizon (current and next 4 quarters)
Idiosyncratic No Idiosyncratic
component component
   Bias: α RMSFE se(α)  p-val se(α)  p-val σ²ε σ²u
Inflation
Final Data
GB -0.28 1.07 0.13 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.53 0.18
SPF -0.48 1.29 0.17 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.46 0.33
Real-Time 
Data
GB -0.27 1.16 0.13 0.05 0.18 0.14 0.69 0.20
SPF -0.47 1.37 0.16 0.00 0.21 0.02 0.80 0.28
Tests of the null of no bias in forecast errors, common bias assumed. The p-values are the probability that the null is true.
If the idiosyncratic component is absent (σ²ε = 0), the variance of the macro shock σ²u becomes the global variance of vth.
If the idiosyncratic component is present, σ²u is the variance of macro shocks.
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